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Summary
Over 41 million Americans now owe more than $1.2 trillion in outstanding federal student loan debt.
Policymakers are considering a number of amendments related to federal student aid programs in the context
of the Higher Education Act reauthorization. In addition to providing a snapshot of key data related to student
loan debt that all policymakers should consider, this brief discusses recommendations for facilitating
repayment and curbing defaults on student loans, including: protecting students from low-performing
institutions; encouraging use of forbearance and deferment mechanisms; and strengthening income-driven
repayment options.
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An Updated Look at Student Loan 
Debt Repayment and Default
Laura W. Perna, PhD; James Kvaal, JD; and Roman Ruiz, MEd
This year, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 
and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce are once again 
preparing for the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA): the law 
that governs the administration of federal student aid programs.1
Since President Lyndon Johnson signed the HEA into 
law in 1965, Congress has renewed it eight times, most 
recently in 2008. It was scheduled again for review
in 2013. For the next iteration, lawmakers are consid-
ering a host of amendments, addressing issues includ-
ing regulatory burden, FAFSA simplification, and the 
need for more complete consumer information about 
student loan programs.
The priorities of the new Administration are also 
coming into focus. The President’s budget proposal 
would simplify the income-driven student loan repay-
ment plans, making the terms slightly more generous 
for some undergraduates while eliminating public 
service loan forgiveness and extending the repayment 
period for graduate students to 30 years. It would also 
eliminate the interest-free deferment that low-income 
students receive while they are enrolled in school. 
Together, these changes would reduce government 
costs by approximately $150 billion over the next  
10 years.2
Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Education 
(ED) is reconsidering previous efforts to protect stu-
dents against student loan debt. The gainful employ-
SUMMARY
• Lawmakers are currently considering new amendments to the 
Higher Education Act that will impact the administration of fed-
eral student aid programs. To aid those discussions, this Issue 
Brief highlights the current state of loan repayment, reviews 
key considerations for federal student loan policy, and offers 
recommendations for facilitating repayment and curbing defaults.
• More than a million students defaulted on their Federal Direct 
Loans in 2015, often with serious consequences. Default rates 
are considerably higher for borrowers who drop out than for 
borrowers who complete their programs. Loan repayment also is 
more problematic for students that attend for-profit institutions.
• Federal policymakers may reduce the risk of non-repayment 
in a few key ways: by protecting students from low-performing 
educational institutions, encouraging use of loan forbearance 
and deferment mechanisms, and strengthening income-driven 
repayment options.  
• Income-driven repayment and loan forgiveness programs can 
help borrowers repay their obligations, but they must be ac-
companied by protections against low-quality colleges to avoid 
imposing costs on taxpayers.
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ment and borrower defense regula-
tions, which protect students against 
high debt burdens and fraudulent 
claims, are likely to be substantially 
revised. ED has withdrawn its strat-
egy to overhaul student loan collec-
tion contracts, and the career official 
responsible for managing the student 
aid programs has resigned.3 
These shifts are occurring amid a 
landscape of student debt – borrow-
ers, debt amounts, repayments, and 
defaults – that has changed markedly 
since 2008. Over 41 million Ameri-
cans now owe more than $1.2 tril-
lion in outstanding federal loan debt, 
and the debt load carried by students 
and their families has tripled over 
the past decade.4 Policymakers must 
pay attention to the new realities of 
a rapidly expanding population of 
current and future borrowers. As an 
aid to policymakers, this Issue Brief 
highlights the current state of loan 
repayment, addresses the implica-
tions of this new landscape for federal 
student loan policy, and offers recom-
mendations for facilitating repayment 
and curbing defaults.
A SNAPSHOT OF DEBT AND 
THE INDICATORS OF DEFAULT
For more than a half-century, the U.S. 
federal government has made loans 
available to college students to serve 
national interests, including national 
security, economic development, and 
educational equity. This practice has 
benefited students enormously. Even 
students with other sources of credit, 
including private student loans and 
credit cards, are better served by 
federal loans, as federal loans have 
lower interest rates, provisions for 
deferment and forbearance, variable 
repayment terms, and debt forgiveness 
programs.5 
The federal loan system in the U.S. 
includes multiple types of loans, each 
with unique eligibility requirements 
and borrowing limits.6 Six percent 
of undergraduates had private loans 
in 2011-12, down from 14 percent 
in 2007-08, and 5 percent had Par-
ent PLUS loans, up from 4 percent in 
2007-08.7 Of those undergraduates 
who borrowed in 2011-12, 85 per-
cent had only federal loans, while 11 
percent had both federal and private 
loans, and 3 percent had only private 
loans.8 In 2015-16, 50 percent of the 
$119 billion in federal financial aid 
received by undergraduates – and 33 
percent of the $184 billion in all aid 
received by undergraduates (includ-
ing federal education tax credits 
and deductions and grants from the 
federal and state governments, institu-
tions, and other sources) – was in the 
form of federal loans.9 As for gradu-
ate students, they received about 36 
percent of 2015 federal loan disburse-
ments (including Grad PLUS) and, 
in 2015-16, 63 percent of all aid to 
graduate students was in the form of 
federal loans.10
Most students borrow little 
relative to the economic benefits of 
a college education. A typical col-
lege graduate with loans borrows less 
than $30,000, and will earn $500,000 
more (on a present value basis) than 
a typical high school graduate.11 But 
policymakers and researchers should 
not overlook the meaningful number 
of students who struggle to manage 
and repay their loans.12
More than a million students 
defaulted on their Federal Direct 
Loans in 2015, often with serious 
consequences.13 Our nation’s heavy 
reliance on student loans to pay col-
lege costs is most problematic for stu-
dents who fail to earn a quality degree, 
students who have difficulty repaying 
loan debt, and students who borrow 
too little (and consequently do not 
enroll, enroll part-time rather than 
full-time, and/or engage in high levels 
of paid employment while pursuing 
their degree). 
 1  Andrew Ujifusa, “Congress May Turn Focus to Higher Ed. 
Law’s Renewal,” Education Week, March 1, 2017. 
 2  Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the U.S. 
Government, Fiscal Year 2018: A New Foundation for 
American Greatness,” 2017.
 3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/
wp/2017/05/24/federal-student-aid-chief-quits-
warning-of-management-issues-under-devos/?utm_
term=.682afd6d525d. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos 
has appointed financial services executive A. Wayne 
Johnson to head the Federal Student Aid office.
 4  The primary source for this Issue Brief is Nicholas Hillman 
and Laura Perna (eds.), “Understanding Student Debt: Who 
Borrows, the Consequences of Borrowing, and the Implica-
tions for Federal Policy,” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 671, Issue 1 
(2017), May 2017. 
 5  https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans#why-federal.  
 6  College Board, Types of College Loans. Available: https://
bigfuture.collegeboard.org/pay-for-college/loans/types-of-
college-loans.
 7  Jennie H. Woo, Eric D. Velez, and Sean A. Simone, “Use 
of Private Loans by Postsecondary Students: Select Years 
2003-04 Through 2011-12,” National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES 2017-420), 2016. 
 8  Ibid.
 9  College Board, Trends in Student Aid 2016. Available: 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid.
 10  Ibid (2016); Nicholas W. Hillman, “Designing and Assessing 
Risk-Sharing Models for Federal Student Aid,” Working pa-
per, Wisconsin Center for Advancement of Postsecondary 
Education, December 19, 2016. Available: https://wiscape.
wisc.edu/wiscape/publications/working-papers/wp018. 
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Default rates are considerably 
higher for borrowers who drop 
out than for borrowers who com-
plete their programs.14 On average, 
fewer than 6 in 10 students who first 
enrolled in higher education in the 
fall of 2009 had completed a degree 
from any college or university within 
six years.15 Among borrowers who 
entered repayment in 2011-12, the 
two-year federal student loan default 
rate was 24 percent for borrowers 
who did not complete their programs, 
compared with 9 percent for borrow-
ers who finished.16 
Partly because of completion 
problems, default rates are inversely 
related to the amount borrowed.17 
Figure 1 helps to illustrate this point. 
Among borrowers who entered 
repayment in 2011-12, the two-year 
federal student loan default rate was 
24 percent for borrowers with loan 
balances below $5,000 and 19 percent 
for those with loan balances between 
$5,001 and $10,000, but 12 percent 
for those with loan balances between 
$10,001 and $20,000 and 7 percent 
for those with loan balances above 
$40,000.18 Students with higher loan 
debt typically have been enrolled for 
more semesters (e.g., completed col-
lege, pursued graduate or professional 
studies).19
Loan repayment may also be 
difficult for students who complete 
their degrees but do not go on to 
earn high incomes.20 One in 10 col-
lege graduates between the ages of 35 
and 44 earns less than $20,000, less 
than the average income of most high 
school graduates.21 While income-
driven repayment plans are available, 
enrolling (and staying enrolled) in 
these programs is administratively 
cumbersome and, until recently, 
awareness of these programs was low.
Loans tend to have more prob-
lematic implications for students 
who attend for-profit institutions 
rather than other types of institu-
tions.22 While there is great variety 
within each sector, students attending 
for-profit institutions borrow more, on 
average, than students attending other 
institutions largely because the costs 
of attendance are higher at for-profit 
institutions.23 Institutional default 
rates and non-repayment rates are also 
higher at for-profit institutions than 
at institutions in other sectors, even 
after controlling for other institutional 
characteristics.24 Among borrowers 
who entered repayment in 2008-09, 
 11  Council of Economic Advisers, Investing in Higher Educa-
tion: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of Student Debt, 
July 2016 [CEA]. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160718_
cea_student_debt.pdf.        
 12  Ibid.
 13  Federal Student Aid, New Direct Loan Defaults. Available: 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/
default. Federal Direct Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans 
(formerly known as Stafford Loans) are now available 
through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program.
 14  College Board (2016); Lawrence Gladieux and Laura W. 
Perna, “Borrowers Who Drop Out:  A Neglected Aspect 
of the College on Credit: A Multilevel Analysis of Student 
Loan Default,” National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education, 2005.
 15  Doug Shapiro, Afet Dundar, Phoebe Khasiala Wakhungu, 
Xin Yuan, Angel Nathan, and Youngsik Hwang, “Completing 
College: A National View of Student Attainment Rates – Fall 
2010 Cohort (Signature Report No. 12),” National Student 
Clearinghouse Research Center, November 2016.
 16  College Board (2016).
 17  Nicholas W. Hillman, “College on Credit: A Multilevel Analy-
sis of Student Loan Default,” Review of Higher Education 
37 (2014): 169-195.
 18  College Board (2016).
 19  Ibid.; Susan Dynarski, “The Trouble with Student Loans? 
Low Earnings, Not High Debt,” Brookings, January 2016.
 20  Bruce Chapman and Lorraine Dearden, “Conceptual and 
Empirical Issues for Alternative Student Loan Designs: The 
Significance of Loan Repayment Burdens for the United 
States,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 671, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 249 – 
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FIGURE 1 BORROWERS ENTERING REPAYMENT: 2011-2012
Source: College Board
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five-year federal student loan default 
rates were considerably higher for 
borrowers who received their first 
federal student loan while attending 
a for-profit (47 percent) institution 
than for borrowers attending a public 
two-year (38 percent) institution or a 
non-selective four-year (27 percent), 
selective four-year (18 percent), or 
most selective four-year (10 percent) 
institution.25
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL 
STUDENT LOAN POLICY 
The goal of federal student loan policy 
should be to encourage students to 
enroll and complete a high-quality 
educational program by enabling stu-
dents to obtain the financial resources 
needed to pay college costs, without 
producing too great a loan repayment 
burden. The reality is obviously more 
complex, and student loans are likely 
to remain a central component of 
our higher education system for the 
foreseeable future. Policymakers can 
ensure that students are well informed 
about student loans by reducing the 
complexity of the federal student aid 
system and simplifying the financial 
aid application form.26
Federal policymakers also must 
reevaluate several fundamental ques-
tions including: What is a reasonable 
amount for students to borrow for 
their education? What is an onerous 
repayment burden? How should the 
risk and cost of student loans be shared 
between students and the government 
(taxpayers)? Are students making wise 
decisions about how much to borrow 
and where to go to college? And for 
how many years should an individual 
have to repay a loan in an income-
driven repayment plan before the 
remaining balance is forgiven? 
The federal government could 
further the production of instructive 
research on these questions by increas-
ing the availability of relevant data 
(e.g., by collecting data on all enrolled 
students and not just student aid recip-
ients, more frequently administering 
the National Postsecondary Student 
Aid Study and providing public-use 
files from the National Student Loan 
Data System), allocating funding to 
support research on student loans (e.g., 
through research competitions spon-
sored by the Institute of Education 
Sciences), and including evaluation 
provisions when establishing and refin-
ing federal aid programs. As an analy-
sis of the development of Direct Loan 
policy over three presidential admin-
istrations confirmed, there is a relative 
absence of reliable data and research to 
inform policy-related decisions.27
With greater access to data, future 
research could better investigate 
questions such as: How do federal 
financial aid policies including loans, 
grants, and tax credits reinforce, or 
perhaps undermine, policy objec-
tives? Who is borrowing too much in 
student loans, and who is borrowing 
not enough? Does the Public Service 
Loan Forgiveness program encour-
age some borrowers to pursue careers 
in public service? What effects would 
potential cost-cutting changes have on 
this program and on borrowers?28 And 
what can the federal government learn 
from the finance policies and practices 
of state governments or colleges and 
universities (see Box 1)? 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FACILITATING 
REPAYMENT
Student loans have risks for borrow-
ers, given the low rates of completion 
at many postsecondary educational 
institutions, as well as the possibility 
of short-term and long-term liquidity 
constraints that prevent loan repay-
ment.31 Federal policymakers may 
reduce the risk of non-repayment by 
protecting students from low-per-
268.
 21  CEA (2016).
 22  Jacob P.K. Gross, Osman Cekic, Don Hossler and Nicholas 
Hillman, “What Matters in Student Loan Default: A Review 
of the Research Literature,” Journal of Student Financial 
Aid 39 (2010): 19-29; Hillman (supra note 18). 
 23  Stephanie Riegg Cellini, Rajeev Darolia, “High Costs, Low 
Resources, and Missing Information: Explaining Student 
Borrowing in the For-Profit Sector,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 
671, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 92-112.
 24  Robert Kelchen and Amy Y. Li, “Institutional Accountability: 
A Comparison of the Predictors of Student Loan Repayment 
and Default Rates,” The ANNALS of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 671, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 
202-223.
 25  College Board (2016).
 26  Beth Akers and Matthew W. Chingos. Game of Loans: The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Student Debt. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006.
 27  Smith, Zakiya, “Exploring the Increased Role of Fed-
eral Executive Branch Policy-Making for Higher Education 
Through Lenses of the Policy Process,” Unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, 2016.
 28  Jason Delisle, “The Coming Public Service Loan Forgive-
ness Bonanza (Evidence Speaks Reports, Vol. 2, No. 2),” 
Brookings, September 2016.
 29  The Institute for College Access and Success, Student Debt 
and the Class of 2015 (October 2016). Available: http://
ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/classof2015.pdf.
 30  Dustin Weeden, “Hot Topics in Higher Education: Student
  Loan Debt,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2015.
NOTES 
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forming institutions, encouraging use 
of forbearance and deferment mecha-
nisms, and strengthening income-
driven repayment options. 
1. PROTECT STUDENTS FROM LOW-
PERFORMING INSTITUTIONS
The U.S. Department of Education 
has few instruments for regulating 
or monitoring the higher education 
marketplace. The federal government 
has historically used cohort default 
rates as one criterion for institutional 
eligibility for HEA Title IV partici-
pation.32 But because loan payments 
can be suspended through deferment 
or forbearance, loan default rates may 
understate the number of students 
who cannot afford to repay their loans. 
In an exploration using loans in nega-
tive amortization (i.e., where pay-
ments are smaller than accrued inter-
est) as an alternative to the cohort 
default rate for measuring institutional 
performance, researchers found higher 
rates of non-repayment.33 
These findings suggest that cohort 
default rates do understate the extent 
to which borrowers are experiencing 
challenges repaying their loans. Insti-
tutional characteristics that predict 
cohort default rates (e.g., shares of 
African American, first-generation, 
and independent students) are even 
stronger predictors of non-repayment. 
One strategy for facilitating repayment 
is to prevent institutions with low 
student loan repayment or completion 
rates from disbursing federal loans 
under Title IV of the HEA.34
Questions remain about the ideal 
approaches for measuring institutional 
performance and using these measures 
to protect consumers. Proposed risk-
sharing strategies include tying some 
form of penalty to institutional per-
formance on metrics like loan default 
rates relative to a peer group.35 Such 
strategies may protect students from 
risky loans and encourage improve-
ments in institutional performance. 
On the other hand, they may also 
limit access for low-income and other 
historically underrepresented groups of 
students, at least for some colleges.36 
Some institutions may respond to 
high-stakes financial incentives by 
opting out of Title IV programs and/
or gaming the metrics.37
The challenge of creating a policy 
that both protects consumers and pre-
serves student access and choice is par-
ticularly salient in the for-profit higher 
education sector. Many researchers 
have voiced important concerns about 
for-profit institutions, questioning 
the implications of profit-maximizing 
motivations, heavy reliance of enrolled 
students on federal loans and Pell 
Grants, low average completion rates, 
and poor employment outcomes.38 In 
response to concerns that some for-
profit colleges were leaving students 
with large debts they were unable to 
repay, the Obama Administration 
introduced “gainful employment” 
 31  Chapman and Dearden (supra note 21).
 32  Robert Kelchen, “Proposing a Federal Risk-Sharing Policy,” 
Lumina Foundation, September 2015.
 33  Kelchen and Li (supra note 25).
 34  Sandy Baum, Student Debt: Rhetoric and Realties of Higher 
Education Financing, The Urban Institute, 2016.
 35  Kelchen (supra note 33).
 36  Hillman (supra note 11).
 37  Ibid.
 38  Cellini and Darolia (supra note 24).
 39  These regulations require occupational programs to 
demonstrate that their graduates’ loan payments are less 
than 8 percent of their earnings or 20 percent of their 
discretionary earnings to be eligible for federal financial 
aid. See: U.S. Department of Education (2015), Fact Sheet: 
Obama Administration Increased Accountability for Low-
Performing For-Profit Institutions.
 40  “Income-driven repayment” refers to programs that use 
borrowers’ income to determine repayment. Research 
generally uses the terms “income-based,” “income-
contingent,” and “income-sensitive” repayment plans inter-
changeably, although the programs may be operationalized 
differently. See: Chapman and Dearden (supra note 21), 
Shireman (note 47).
 41  Office of Management and Budget (2017), Budget of the 
U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2018: Major Savings and 
Reforms. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/msar.pdf.
42  U.S. Government Accountability Office (2016), Federal Stu-
dent Loans: Education Needs to Improve Its Income-Driven
  Repayment Plan Budget Estimates. [GAO] Available: http://
www.gao.gov/assets/690/681064.pdf.
 43  College Board (2016).
NOTES 
BOX 1: STATE-BASED STUDENT LOAN POLICIES 
 The share of bachelor’s degree graduates with loan debt and the average debt 
amount for borrowers vary widely by state, ranging from a low of $18,900 
in Utah to a high of $36,100 in New Hampshire.29 States have advanced a 
range of initiatives that may influence the effects of federal loan programs on 
student outcomes. States have proposed, and in some instances created, their 
own loan forgiveness and repayment plans (35 states), programs to refinance 
student loans (7 states), tax deductions and credits for student loan payments 
(e.g., Maine, Rhode Island), low- and no-interest loans (e.g., Massachusetts, 
Georgia), and child savings accounts (7 states).30
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rules.39 The Trump Administration 
appears likely to revisit these rules.
2. STRENGTHEN INCOME-DRIVEN 
REPAYMENT OPTIONS
Income-driven repayment options 
may be effective in reducing the 
risk of default for individuals who 
have low earnings initially or over 
the course of their lifetime.40 These 
options set monthly payments on a 
sliding scale based on income, with 
any outstanding balance forgiven after 
a defined repayment period. These 
plans allow students to borrow to pay 
for college costs, while protecting 
them against the risk that their invest-
ment will not pay off.
There are five income-driven 
repayment options, creating consid-
erable complexity for students. One 
such plan, named REPAYE, sets pay-
ments at 10 percent of discretionary 
income, with any remaining balance 
forgiven after 10 years (for borrow-
ers in public service jobs), 20 years 
(for borrowers of undergraduate loans 
who are not in public service jobs) or 
25 years (for borrowers of graduate 
school loans who are not in public 
service jobs). 
The Trump Administration has 
proposed eliminating all of the exist-
ing plans and creating a new one 
that sets payments at 12.5 percent of 
income, with any remaining balance 
forgiven after 15 years (for under-
graduates) or 30 years (for graduate 
students). It would also eliminate the 
interest-free deferral offered low-
income students while they remain in 
college. These changes would make 
the program more generous for some 
undergraduates, but would substan-
tially increase debt burdens on public 
servants and graduate students and 
save approximately $15 billion a 
year.41 
Participation in income-driven 
plans has increased in recent years, 
rising from 10 percent of Direct 
Loan recipients in repayment in June 
2013 to 24 percent in June 2016.42 In 
2016, 25 percent of all federal Direct 
Loan borrowers in repayment, and 
43 percent of all federal Direct Loan 
dollars, were in an income-driven 
repayment plan.43 Some researchers 
suggest that there may be benefits to 
enrolling at least some borrowers in 
an income-driven repayment program 
automatically, including reducing dis-
tress among low-income borrowers.44 
But efforts to increase participation in 
income-driven repayment should con-
sider ways to reduce potential negative 
consequences, including insulating 
students and colleges from the impli-
cations of excessive debt loads. 
Increasing participation may 
have costs to taxpayers, depending on 
repayment schedules and participa-
tion rates. Correctly estimating the 
costs of income-driven repayment 
is difficult, given the uncertainty in 
forecasting rates of participation in 
income-driven repayment plans, bor-
rowers’ debt level, borrowers’ incomes 
over a decade or longer, and interest 
rates.45 ED underestimated the costs 
of income-driven repayment plans 
for Direct Loans made in fiscal years 
2009 through 2016, largely because 
of the rising volume of loans in these 
plans.46
In addition to identifying sources 
to fund the costs of income-driven 
repayment plans, federal policymak-
ers also should consider optimal 
approaches for administering the 
program. Unlike in England and Aus-
tralia, student loan records in the U.S. 
are not automatically linked to the tax 
system and, consequently, borrowers in 
income-driven repayment plans must 
annually report their income to ED. 
Many researchers have proposed cre-
ating such a link in the U.S. Though 
this change would reduce the com-
 44  Chapman and Dearden (supra note 21).
 45  Wenhua Di and Kelly D. Edmiston, “Student Loan Relief 
Programs: Implications for Borrowers and the Federal 
Government,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 671, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 
224-248.
 46  GAO  (2016).
 47  Robert Shireman, “Learn Now, Pay Later: A History of In-
come Contingent Student Loans in the United States,” The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 671, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 184-201.
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plexity of the current requirements 
for annual verification of income and 
would ensure accuracy of reported 
income, there is some speculation that 
this change might also reduce overall 
compliance with the tax system.47
CONCLUSION
Student loans are a pillar of the 
United States’ system of postsecondary 
education. While borrowing to pay for 
college remains a wise investment for 
most students, many students default 
on their loans or make payments that 
are smaller than their accrued inter-
est. To meet federal higher education 
goals in the United States, policies 
should ensure that students are well 
informed about loans and should pro-
tect students from the risks of unaf-
fordable loans. 
Policymakers can accomplish these 
goals, in part, by strengthening bor-
rowers’ protections against institutions 
and programs where they are unlikely 
to be able to repay their loans and by 
simplifying income-driven repayment 
options currently available. Income-
driven repayment and loan forgiveness 
programs tend to help borrowers repay 
and pursue careers, but they must be 
accompanied by protections against 
low-quality colleges to avoid impos-
ing costs on taxpayers. For all of the 
uncertainty currently swirling around 
the higher education landscape, 
the reality of a growing and debt-
burdened population of student loan 
borrowers must compel lawmakers and 
education officials to act decisively in 
the best interest of all Americans.
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